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BOOK REVIEWS
THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY. Edited with an Introduction
by Edward S. Mason.' Cambridge: Harvard University Press. I959.
Pp. xv, 335. $6.75.
This is not another symposium that one would like to have read but
not to read. It is not a potpourri of academic afterthought. Rather it is
a coherent collection of essays concerning the role of the large corpora-
tion in modern society. Professor Mason has attempted to assemble a
group of materials which analyze this role in depth. He has been success-
ful in his attempt.
The views of fourteen contributors are presented. Four of them are
primarily concerned with the problem of the large corporation's respon-
sibility and accountability. All of these writers dismiss the concept of
"shareholder democracy" as anachronistic. With a passing bow to legis-
lative efforts to inject substance into the shareholders' franchise, they
view shareholders' reins on corporate control as neither feasible nor
particularly desirable. As expressed by Professor Chayes, "of all those
standing in relation to the large corporation, the shareholder is least
subject to its power. Through the mechanism of the security markets,
his relation to the corporation is rendered highly abstract and formal,
quite limited in scope, and readily reducible to monetary terms. The
market affords him a way of breaking this relation that is simple and
effective. He can sell his stock, and remove himself, qua shareholder, at
least from the power of the corporation." (p.40) Professor Mason adds
that "it is a little difficult to see in the ownership of corporate securities
the source of that invigorating moral, social, and political development
that Jefferson saw in private property." (p.i5)
These four authors differ both as to whom large corporations should
be accountable and as to the methods for achieving accountability. Dean
Rostow calls for a frank recognition that the primary responsibility of
corporate management is to its stockholders. Corporate responsibility,
he suggests, means corporate conformity to the rule of long-term
profits maximization and a break with the policy of moderation in pric-
ing that has resulted in a "serious distortion in the pattern of resource
use." (p.65) Professor Chayes looks to a number of interacting corpo-
rate "constituencies," employees and dealers to cite his two examples,
to promote corporate responsibility to the public. Professor Brewster
sees the establishment of effective outside supervision over management
as the prime requirement in the achievement of corporate responsibility.
Legal steps to weaken the ties between the corporation and its managerial
employees, to decrease corporate control over its dealers, and to lessen
the independence, permitted by internal financing, from the judgment of
outside investors would, he feels, promote restraints analogous to the
1 George F. Baker Professor of Economics, Harvard University.
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checks and balances in the federal government. Particularly interesting
is his suggestion that barriers to executive mobility be lowered "first, by
removing the tax encouragement to methods of compensation which tend
to personnel captivity; second, by positive prohibition of private arrange-
ments which penalize leaving one corporate jurisdiction for another." (p.
8o) Professor Lintner's paper on "The Financing of Corporations" may
somewhat offset the force of these views with evidence that large corpora-
tions are not increasingly dependent on internal financing. Finally, to
Professor Kaysen, the control of large corporations can best be achieved
by the external promotion of competition through our antitrust laws.
In actuality, however, he looks to a combination of "broader control of
business power by agencies external to business" and the "institutionali-
zation within the firm of responsibility for the exercise of power" to
achieve the desired result. (p. 103) These four papers present little in
the way of concrete proposals, although Professor Kaysen has elsewhere
written at length on his views.2 But the authors' critical awareness is a
stimulating portent of what we can hope will finally be an extensive post-
Berle analysis of these problems.
The success of the lawyers in articulating their views is matched by
that of the economists, including, of course, Professor Kaysen. Pro-
fessor Schmookler contends in a paper on "Technological Progress and
the Modem American Corporation" that small firms can and do spend
proportionally as much on research as large firms. Our patent system,
he concludes, is at least in large measure responsible for our research
deficiencies, and he forcefully argues that compulsory licensing and
government bounties are practical alternatives to the. present patent
system. Mr. Chamberlain's article on "The Corporation and the Trade
Union" also requires comment. He argues that the unions' major con-
tribution has not been in the area of wage negotiations, but rather "in
the making of shop rules and their application in the grievance process."
(p. 136) He suggests that in this light it may be "possible to restrict
more severely the unions' strong-arm tactics, without thereby endanger-
ing their ability to secure individual fair treatment for their members in
the grievance process." (p. 136) To this reviewer, at least, it is doubt-
ful that unions have been as ineffective in their efforts to raise wages as
Mr. Chamberlain indicates or that union "strong-arm" tactics should
ever be condoned, whether or not the unions have made a contribution
in the field of wage negotiations.
Political and social scientists also have contributed their views on
"The Corporation Man," "The Corporation, Its Satellites, and the
Local Community," and "The Body Politic of the Corporation." Their
conclusions are interesting, although hardly startling. It is, for example,
valuable to read Professor Warner's evidence concerning the "social mo-
bility" of business executives, but one need only look around in the
corporate world to come to the same conclusions. Three essays dealing
with foreign aspects of corporate development round out the volume:
2 KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST PoLIcY - AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
(1959).
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"The American Corporation in Underdeveloped Areas," "The Private
and Public Corporation in Great Britain," and "Industrial Enterprise in
Russia." The latter essay is a particularly stimulating study illustrating
the problems faced by corporate managers in a planned society; the
essay serves to emphasize the fortunate position of American corporate
enterprise.
This book does have several weaknesses. One is inherent in any collec-
tion of essays - it lacks the unity of thought and style which mark the
work of any one of the contributors. Furthermore, only academicians
are represented. In a discussion of the most basic problems of the corpo-
rate world, this seems unfortunate. Finally, there are several obvious
gaps in the volume as a total view of large corporations. Professor Mason
mentions one of these in his foreword -there is no discussion of the
standards used in the choosing of corporate executives. An equally ser-
ious omission is the lack of any empirical analysis of the effect of our tax
provisions on the corporate decision-making process. One volume could
not, however, cover all phases of "The Corporation in Modern Society."
I concur in Professor Berle's statement that this book is "the best body
of material on the American corporate system yet offered." (p. xv)
THOMAS EHRLICH*
SETTLING DISPUTES IN SOVIET SociETY: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS. By John N. Hazard.' New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press. 196o. Pp. xiv, 534. $9.50.
Until recently writers on Soviet law tended to treat it largely as one
big "current event" or - at best - as a discontinuous series of current
events patched together in what one hoped made up a connected story.
The primary data were scant, inaccessible, and unreliable. The mono-
graphic literature inside and to some extent outside the Soviet Union
had in many cases been contributed by men who were, in the older as
well as the contemporary sense of the term, interested; it was often hard
to hear the voice of reason over the harsh rasp of axes being ground to
a dull edge. The current events were sometimes assimilated, or con-
trasted, to pre-Soviet Russian law, but legal developments of the early
period of Soviet power were relatively neglected. They seemed to have
been isolated from the recent past by the Great Purges, the War, and the
late-Stalinist Terror.
In the past few years the study of the Soviet legal scene in the twen-
ties has come into more favor. Simple lapse of time may lend enchant-
ment, if not perspective. Besides, within the Soviet Union the legal re-
formers venturing out in the thaw of 1955-57 sought support and legiti-
mate ancestry in evoking "the noble, mythical past when the Revolu-
* Member of the Wisconsin Bar.
' Professor of Public Law and Government and member of the staff of the
Russian Institute, Columbia University.
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